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Re-inventing an old tradition: the ‘Old Academy’ of Antiochus of Ascalon 
 
 
1. Antiochus at the Ruins of the Academy 
In one of the most evocative introductions to his dialogues, in the last book of De Finibus1, 
Cicero describes how he and his interlocutors, his brother Quintus, Marcus Piso, T. 
Pomponius Atticus and Cicero’s cousin Lucius visit the spot of Plato’s Academy, while on 
a grand educational tour to the Greek world in 79 BC; in stark contrast to the gloomy 
reality resulting from the Roman siege of the city, which had led to the closure of the 
philosophical schools (as a consequence of Athens’ involvement in the Mithridatic War), 
Athens appears there as an idealised space, the birthplace of the greatest politicians, poets, 
rhetoricians and philosophers, whose scenes of action (although deserted) offer a 
reminiscence of glory and inspiration for the Roman youth: Phalerum brings to mind the 
great rhetorician Demosthenes, whereas the, by that time, deserted Academy, makes one 
remember Cicero’s favourite, Carneades, and the legendary debates he held on that spot 
many decades before2. As Cicero puts it:  
Multa in omni parte Athenarum sunt in ipsis locis indicia summorum virorum 
Cicero, Fin. 5.5 
In every quarter of Athens the mere sites contain many mementoes of the most 
illustrious men. 
Athens thus appears at the beginning of the first century BC to be on the map as an 
educational destination, but more as a ‘landscape of memory’, rather than of original 
intellectual production. The return to the past illustrated by Cicero in the preface to the last 
book of his De Finibus becomes more suggestive, if we consider that the book is dedicated 
to the exposition of the ethical theory of Antiochus. The latter was teaching at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Fin. 5.1-5. 
2 Fin. 5.4.	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Ptolemaum, another gymnasium of Athens, at the time when Cicero visited the city with 
his companions in 79 BC3. Antiochus is presented as the most important teacher of 
philosophy at Cicero’s time4; even he, however, is looking back to the past, matching the 
attitude of Cicero and his companions. His ‘Old Academy’, claimed to represent the 
ancient tradition, for which Athens was becoming so popular among the Roman elite, and 
not a new direction of thought. Thus, what was ‘new’ about Antiochus was precisely that 
he was looking backwards: he was the first philosopher to break the institutional continuity 
of Plato’s school by challenging the authority of its last scholarch, Philo of Larissa, and 
attempting a resurrection of an earlier tradition from which his predecessors were 
considered to have diverted. The testimonies, as the following one from Sextus’ Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism, refer to this movement as a ‘fifth Academy’ following the ‘Middle Academy’ 
of Arcesilaus, the ‘New Academy’ of Carneades and the controversial fourth Academy of 
Philo:  
Ἀκαδηµίαι δὲ γεγόνασιν, ὡς φασὶ<ν οἱ> πλείους [ἢ], τρεῖς, µία µὲν καὶ 
ἀρχαιοτάτη ἡ τῶν περὶ Πλάτωνα, δευτέρα δὲ καὶ µέση ἡ τῶν περὶ Ἀρκεσίλαον 
τὸν ἀκουστὴν Πολέµωνος, τρίτη δὲ καὶ νέα ἡ τῶν περὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ 
Κλειτόµαχον· ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τετάρτην προστιθέασι τὴν περὶ Φίλωνα καὶ 
Χαρµίδαν, τινὲς δὲ καὶ πέµπτην καταλέγουσι τὴν περὶ [τὸν] Ἀντίοχον.	  S.E. 
PH 1.220	  
According to most people there have been three Academies⎯ the first and 
most ancient that of Plato and his school, the second or middle Academy that 
of Arcesilaus, the pupil of Polemo, and his School, the third or New Academy 
that of the school of Carneades and Cleitomachus. Some, however, add as a 
fourth that of the school of Philo and Charmidas; and some even count the 
School of Antiochus as a fifth. 
The main rationale for Antiochus’ move, and the reason why he is listed in Sextus as 
initiating a new phase of Academic history, was that the school since the Academic 
Sceptics took over had taken a false direction: contrary to the claims of Philo and his 
predecessors reaching down to Arcesilaus (who took over the school in 270 BC), the ‘real’ 
Academy, according to Antiochus, did not renounce the possibility of knowledge and thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Fin. 5.1. 
4 Cf.  Luc. 113. 
	   	   University of Athens  
  ‘Plato’s Academy’ Conference 
  12-16 December 2012 
  Georgia Tsouni (Bern) 
  georgia.tsouni@cantab.net 	  
	   	   3	  
was not committed merely to sceptical enquiry, as Arcesilaus and his followers using the 
example of Socratic practice advocated. The sceptical Academy had undergone significant 
changes as well: Arcesilaus, the first scholarch after the school’s sceptical turn, had denied 
the possibility of knowledge altogether. Carneades advocated a soft form of scepticism, 
probabilism, which allowed extensive argument in favour of particular positions, which 
were judged according to their persuasive power. Philo, at least in the theses he formulated 
while in Rome, conceded that some kind of knowledge (katalēpsis) was possible5 but he 
refused that one needed, or could formulate, a criterion for it; the description of the Sosus 
episode in Cicero’s Lucullus suggests that for this position Philo sought Platonic authority, 
proposing perhaps a new reading of Plato along such lines6. For Antiochus this was not a 
defensible (or even coherent) position and thus, once there was no real institutional 
commitment between him and Philo, seized the opportunity and advocated a dogmatic 
theory, which he now presented as the true Academic tradition⎯ and a viable way to 
defend katalēpsis. 
The fact that this revival movement took place away from Athens, when Antiochus 
sought to escape the imminent Roman siege of the city7, is indicative of the quest for new 
orientations on the part of Greek-speaking intellectuals during this era, and the ensuing 
‘decentralisation’ of philosophical activity away from its birthplace8.  In search for a new 
role, Antiochus went into the service of the Roman general Lucullus9, as an advisor and 
perhaps mediator for the contacts of his Roman patron with the Greek-speaking local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Our most important testimony is S.E. PH 1.235: Οἱ δὲ περὶ Φίλωνά φασιν ὅσον µὲν ἐπὶ τῷ Στωικῷ 
κριτηρίῳ, τουτέστι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι τὰ πράγµατα, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν 
πραγµάτων αὐτῶν, καταληπτά.  
6 Cf. Tarrant (1985:44). 
7 Antiochus’ reaction to the ‘Roman books’ of Philo, as presented in Cicero’s Lucullus, may plausibly be 
regarded as the first expression of Antiochus’ new orientation. By contrast, Glucker (1978:20) suggests that 
Antiochus expressed his dissident views already at the beginning of the 90s BC, while a member of Philo’s 
school. 
8 D. Sedley (2003:31) refers to this as the ‘epoch-making change that philosophy underwent in the 1st century 
BC’. Another case of a philosopher who moved to Rome during this period is the Epicurean Philodemus, see 
Sedley (2003:35). Panaetius in the previous generation had already created strong bonds with the Scipios (s. 
Cic. Luc. 5), which were sustained through frequent visits to Rome. 
9 S. Luc. 4: eum (sc. Antiochum) secum et quaestor habuit (sc. Lucullus) et post aliquot annos imperator. 
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communities in the East10. It is from Alexandria in 87 BC, following Lucullus11, that he 
responds to Philo’s so-called Roman books12 and, through a treatise entitled Sosus13, for 
the first time openly challenges the Academic identity as represented by its institutional 
head.  
Assuming that the promotion of the ancient tradition took place after Antiochus 
was already in the service of Lucullus, and had acquired a name in the Roman elite, the 
importance assigned to the ancestry of his views in Cicero gains in significance. The 
auctoritas of the ancients14 had considerable value in a society, which presented the 
‘customs of the forefathers’ (mores maiorum)15 and their exempla as a constant point of 
validation; the notion of auctoritas itself had particular political connotations and 
associations with the power of the Senate (and thus not surprisingly Cicero is keen to use it 
in passages which bear the influence of Antiochus)16. Moreover, Greek paideia (including 
philosophy as an essential tool) was becoming important symbolic capital and sign of 
power and influence, serving the Ciceronian ideal of humanitas, of the cultivated citizen of 
the republic. This was, after all, an important reason why Cicero undertook the writing of 
philosophical treatises and the huge task of translating and introducing Greek philosophy 
to Rome in the first place. The Antiochean spokesman again in the preface to De Finibus is 
eager to underline the educational role of his movement in the service of the training of the 
aspiring Roman political elite; the whole speech has a didactic character addressed to the 
young cousin of Cicero, Lucius. In this respect, it is suggestive that Antiochus underlines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Plutarch in his Life of Lucullus (42.3) refers to the philosopher as his ‘friend and companion’ (φίλον… καὶ 
συµβιωτὴν ). According to the testimony of Cicero (Luc. 61), Antiochus died in the company of Lucullus 
during a campaign in Syria. The evidence from Philodemus’ Index Academicorum, col. 34 (s. Brink 2007:89) 
also states that Antiochus spent most of his life in Rome and the eastern provinces in the service of generals 
and died in Mesopotamia following Lucullus. For the role of Greek-speaking intellectuals as advisors to the 
Roman elite, see Glucker (1978:24) and Crawford (1978:203). 
11 Luc. 11. 
12 In Acad. 11, we find the reference to two books of Philo, who reached Antiochus in Alexandria. 
13 Luc. 12. 
14 S. e.g. Fin. 4.44. 
15 For a direct comparison between the ancient philosophers and the Roman forefathers, see Fin. 4.62. 
16 Cf. Sedley (1997:111): ‘Yet it is this Latin word which, by combining the notions of leadership, ownership, 
prestige, and validation, most informatively conveys the commanding status that the founder (the auctor) of a 
Greek philosophical system held in the eyes of its subsequent adherents’. 
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the contribution of the ‘ancients’ not only to philosophical theory17 but also to the 
development of rhetoric, something which would make the school particularly suitable as a 
propaedeutic to statesmanship18: 
Ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis 
historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut 
nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit 
accedere. ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes 
extiterunt.  Cic. Fin. 5.7 
Not only may you derive from their writings and teachings  (sc. of ‘the 
ancients’) all liberal learning, all history, every choice form of style, but 
accomplishments in such variety that no one without such equipment can be 
properly prepared to approach any task of any distinction. From this school 
sprang the orators, from this school the generals and the governors of states. 
 
2. Antiochus’ Platonic ‘disciplina’ 
It is time now to turn to the identity of the ancient tradition that Antiochus aimed at 
reviving. The credo of Antiochus’ school relied on a ‘genealogical’ argument from 
succession (diadochē), which postulated the oral transmission of doctrine through master-
pupil relationships; according to that, philosophy which had its starting point in Plato was 
transmitted through the equally authoritative channels of the followers of Plato in the 
Academy (including Speusippus, Xenocrates, Crantor down to the dissident Arcesilaus 
who turned the Academy to scepticism) and the Peripatos (including Plato’s pupil Aristotle 
and Theophrastus); the successors of Theophrastus reaching from Strato, the pupil of 
Theophrastus, down to Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, are presented in Antiochean 
passages as merely a degenerated shadow of the originators of the Lyceum ⎯both on 
matters of style and philosophical acumen⎯ and are thus excluded from Antiochus’ 
canon19. One of the ‘programmatic’ passages of Antiochus in Cicero reads as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See especially De Orat. 1.43. 
18 Cf. also Fin. 5.74. 
19 Fin. 5.13-14. 
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in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii soli numerantur, qui Academici 
vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam 
Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps Aristoteles. Cic. Fin. 5.7 
Among the ‘Old Academy’ are to be reckoned, as you heard Antiochus say, 
not only those who are called Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, 
Crantor and the rest, but also the ancient Peripatetics, whose chief is Aristotle. 
This inclusive reading of the Platonic tradition might strike us as odd; in this lies also the 
difficulty of comparing Antiochus with the Platonist movements, which followed, i.e. the 
so-called Middle Platonism: nowhere, is Antiochus attempting to recover the teaching of 
Plato himself as more authoritative than that of his successors20. Rather, Antiochus claimed 
that in order to understand Plato one should study him through the Academico-Peripatetic 
tradition that he left behind him, a tradition characterized, according to him, by unity and 
consistency.  As Varro puts it, echoing Antiochus21:  
Platonis autem auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et 
consentiens duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est Academicorum 
et Peripateticorum, qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Cicero, 
Acad. 1.17 
Starting with Plato, a thinker of manifold variety and fertility, there was 
established a philosophy that, though it had two appellations, was really a 
single uniform system, that of the Academic and the Peripatetic schools, which 
while agreeing in doctrine differed in name. 
The emphasis is here on the creation of a coherent set of doctrines, a certa formula 
disciplinae, as Cicero puts it in the Academica; other formulations used in this sense in 
relation to Antiochus’ understanding of the ancient tradition are ars philosophiae, ordo 
rerum and descriptio disciplinae22. This attempt at systematization is shown in the way the 
philosophy of the ‘ancients’ is taken in Varro’s presentation of the Antiochean system in 
Cicero’s Academica to fit into the standard Hellenistic tripartition of the philosophical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Later Platonists either incorporated Aristotelian ideas but only, explicitly, in the service of recovering 
Plato’s doctrine, or some of them like Numenius  and Atticus adopted an explicitly hostile stance towards 
Aristotelianism, see Numenius apud Euseb. Praep. Ev. xiv.5.8; ibid. xi.1.2; xv. 4.6 ff.; 5.3. 
21 Cf. Luc. 15. 
22 Cicero Acad. 1.17 
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discourse into physics, ethics and dialectic (logic)23. It is instructive to compare the 
ascription of a threefold philosophical system to the ‘ancients’ with a passage from Sextus 
whose main idea resembles strongly the Antiochean views as found in Acad. 1: 	  
πλὴν οὗτοι µὲν ἐλλιπῶς ἀνεστράφθαι δοκοῦσιν, ἐντελέστερον δὲ παρὰ τούτους 
οἱ εἰπόντες τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ µέν τι εἶναι φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· 
ὧν δυνάµει µὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός, περὶ πολλῶν µὲν φυσικῶν, [περὶ] 
πολλῶν δὲ ἠθικῶν, οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ λογικῶν διαλεχθείς· ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν 
Ξενοκράτη καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου, ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἔχονται τῆσδε 
τῆς διαιρέσεως.	  S.E. Adversus Mathematicos 7.16 	  
These thinkers (sc. Xenophanes and Archelaus), however, seemed to have 
handled the question incompletely, and, in comparison with them, the view of 
those who divide philosophy into Physics, Ethics, and Logic is more 
developed. Of these Plato is potentially the originator, as he discussed many 
problems of physics and of ethics, and not a few of logic; but those who most 
explicitly adopt this division are Xenocrates and the Peripatetics, and also the 
Stoics. 	  	  
In Sextus’ testimony, it is stated that Plato was potentially the originator of the division of 
philosophy into three branches (δυνάµει µὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός), since he discussed 
many issues pertaining to physics, ethics and dialectic. However, the source adds that the 
division was in the most explicit way (ῥητότατα) made by the followers of Xenocrates (οἱ 
περὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτη) and of the Peripatos (οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου): thus, whereas clearly 
Plato was the starting point, his successors philosophically improved on his input 
⎯something which implicitly justifies studying his thought through them. The members of 
the Stoa (ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς) are added as those who followed the two above groups in 
making the same division; but in any case their role is underplayed. The inclusion of both 
Academics and Peripatetics alongside Plato as precursors of an idea found also in the 
Stoics, points to Antiochus as a source of the text in Sextus. It would be hasty to assume, 
though, that Antiochus merely projected a Stoic classification onto the ‘ancients’. The 
Peripatetic provenance of a threefold division of the philosophical logos receives support 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid. 1.19-33. 
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from Aristotle’s Topics 1.1424: there, Aristotle gives instructions on how to select and 
collect ethical, physical and logical statements and doxai for use in debate, suggesting a 
threefold distinction of the philosophical discourse as well. Also, in one of his fragments, 
Theophrastus classifies the Timaeus as the ‘physics’ of Plato25, showing that the process of 
systematization of Platonic philosophy into distinct domains of enquiry had begun already 
within the Peripatos. Antiochus could thus be under the influence of such Peripatetic 
views, themselves also representative of the old tradition, as he understood it, when 
ascribing the threefold classification of philosophy to the ‘Old Academy’.  
 
In the case of ethics, the unity of the tradition was taken to be based on a shared 
catalogue of doctrines and classifications, such as what is the telos, the ‘goods’ and ‘which 
things are to be sought and avoided’26. In a passage which echoes Antiochean ideas in 
Cicero, the idea of a ‘life according to nature’ is ascribed to Polemo, the last scholarch of 
the Platonic school before its sceptical turn, but it was, according to Antiochus, before him 
expressed by Aristotle as well (who was of course in agreement with Theophrastus on the 
issue) something which allegedly proves the unity of ‘Old Academy’ and the Peripatos:  
Polemoni et iam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt, quae paulo ante dixi. ergo 
nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem 
bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis 
a natura datis. Fin. 2.34 
Polemo, and also before him Aristotle, held that the primary objects (sc. of 
desire) were the ones I have just mentioned. Thus, arose the doctrine of the 
Old Academy and the Peripatetics maintaining that the ultimate Good is to 
live in accordance with nature, that is to enjoy the first natural supplies with 
the use of virtue. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Aristotle, Top. 105b19-21: ἔστι δ' ὡς τύπῳ περιλαβεῖν τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τῶν προβληµάτων µέρη τρία· αἱ 
µὲν γὰρ ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ λογικαί. This corresponds to the order of presentation of 
Antiochean philosophy by Varro in Acad. 1. 
25 Theophrastus, Fr. 230 FHS&G.  
26 S. Acad. 1.18: idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio. In Ibid. 22, 
this classification is explicitly attributed to the Peripatetics: Ita tripertita ab his inducitur ratio bonorum, 
atque haec illa sunt tria genera quae putant plerique Peripateticos dicere. id quidem non falso; est enim haec 
partitio illorum; illud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos qui tum appellarentur alios Peripateticos 
arbitrantur. 
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Polemo is taken here, according to the ‘transitive’ view of authority that Antiochus 
represents to stand for the entire Platonic tradition. The fact that evidence regarding his 
writings and philosophical doctrines is extremely thin suggests that he was mostly 
dedicated to oral teaching. The passage shows that Antiochus was willing to read Polemo, 
or supplement him, through Peripatetic assumptions about nature as the basis of ethical 
evaluation⎯ such assumptions are fully developed in the last book of Cicero’s De Finibus, 
a book which is explicitly signalled as Peripatetic27. Perhaps such assumptions about the 
role of nature supplied a sort of justification for views on which both Academics and 
Peripatetics were in principle in agreement, such as the principle of a ‘life according to 
virtue’; a justification, which seemed to be relevant to the philosophical agenda set by 
Stoicism, where ethics was founded on nature as well. 
Another way of interpretation of the Platonic tradition by Antiochus may be 
detected in physics, where an active and passive principle, the two archai that Antiochus 
postulates for the explanation of the physical reality, can be taken to express both the 
Divine demiurge and the passive ‘material’ which the Demiurge shapes in the Timaeus, but 
also the Aristotelian principles of form and matter. The account is carefully crafted at such 
a general level as to be able to express both Platonic and Peripatetic ideas: 
De natura autem ita dicebant (sc. veteres) ut eam dividerent in res duas, ut 
altera esset  efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, eaque efficeretur 
aliquid. in eo quod efficeret vim esse censebant, in eo autem quod efficeretur 
tantum modo materiam quondam. Cicero, Acad. 1.24 
In the domain of physics, they (sc. the ancient philosophers) divided nature 
into two principles, the one being the active, and the other the passive, out of 
which under the influence of the active force something comes to be. The 
active principle they deemed to be a force, the one acted upon a sort of matter. 
An interpretation of the Platonic ideas along these lines was probably supported by the 
writings of Peripatetics themselves, who attempted to systematize Plato’s views for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For the idea that the views of Polemo were the same as Aristotle’s, see also Fin. 5. 14: antiquorum autem 
sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli fuisse et 
Polemonis docet. The sole evidence in Polemo’s fragments of an attempt to offer a foundation of ethics in 
nature is a reference by Clement (Fr. 97 Gigante) to Polemo’s books ‘On Life According to Nature’ (περὶ τοῦ 
κατὰ φύσιν βίου).  
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doxographical purposes; Theophrastus, like Antiochus, reduces the story of the Timaeus to 
a two-principle scheme for the sake of codifying the Platonic views on physical 
enquiry28⎯ such a systematisation results significantly in separating the realm of the 
transcendent Ideas from Plato’s ‘views on nature’: 
ὁ µέντοι Θεόφραστος τοὺς ἄλλους προϊστορήσας “τούτοις, φησίν, 
ἐπιγενόµενος Πλάτων, τῇ µὲν δόξῃ καὶ τῇ δυνάµει πρότερος τοῖς δὲ χρόνοις 
ὕστερος καὶ τὴν πλείστην πραγµατείαν περὶ τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας 
ποιησάµενος, ἐπέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοῖς φαινοµένοις ἁψάµενος τῆς περὶ 
φύσεως ἱστορίας· ἐν ᾗ δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς βούλεται ποιεῖν τὸ µὲν ὑποκείµενον ὡς 
ὕλην ὃ προσαγορεύει πανδεχές, τὸ δὲ ὡς αἴτιον καὶ κινοῦν ὃ περιάπτει τῇ τοῦ 
θεοῦ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δυνάµει.”	   Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica CAG t.9 
p.26.5-15 Diels=Theophrastus Fr. 230 Fortenbaugh et al. 
Theophrastus, however, after giving his account of the other (natural 
philosophers), says: “After these came Plato, before them in reputation and 
ability though after them in date. He concerned himself chiefly with 
metaphysics, but also attended to phenomena, taking up the enquiry 
concerning nature; here, he wished to make the principles two in number, one 
underlying (things) as matter⎯ and this he calls ‘receptive of all things’; the 
other being cause and source of movement, and this he attaches to the power 
of god and of the good”. (Trans. Fortenbaugh et al., 1992) 
On the other hand, the fundamental critique against the Platonic Ideas, which is found in 
Aristotle’s writings is familiar to Antiochus, but he isolates it as one of the elements, which 
threatens the unity of the ‘old tradition’, and should thus be excised29: Antiochus’ own 
opinion was that, pace Aristotle, some interpretation of the Platonic Ideas was compatible 
with the system of the ‘ancients’ and could be accommodated therein⎯however, not in the 
domain of physics but in the epistemology30. 
This systematic organization of the philosophical discourse, imposed on the 
Platonic tradition, was the outcome of the quest for the creation of a methodologically 
consistent philosophical system, which could easily be transmitted and compared. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Cf. the discussion of this passage by B. Inwood in Sedley (2012:214). 
29 Acad. 1.33. 
30 See Acad. 1.30: mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem, solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola 
cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset (hanc illi ἰδέαν appellabant, iam a 
Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere).  
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quest for a coherent system was encouraged by the Zeitgeist as well: an additional appeal 
of Antiochus’ enterprise resulted from the bridging of differences and the presentation of 
Greek philosophy (at least its major strands, i.e. with the exception of Epicureanism) as a 
unitary field of knowledge, a repository of accumulated wisdom, rather than as a constant 
questioning and controversy (controversia) for which the Greek philosophers had made a 
name in Rome. In an anecdote cited by Cicero in the first book of De Legibus, the Roman 
proconsul Lucius Gellius is said on his arrival to Athens to have gathered together all 
philosophers and asked them to finally ‘reach an agreement and not waste their lives in 
argument’31, offering his help for reaching a compromise. Cicero himself is ironical about 
this misunderstanding of what philosophy is about! In some cases, philosophical 
controversy formed a prejudice against Greeks in general, as in the remarks of Crassus in 
De Orat. 1.47:  
Verbi enim controversia iam diu torquet Graeculos homines contentionis 
cupidiores quam veritatis.  
Controversy about a word (sc. the orator) has long tormented those 
Greeklings, fonder as they are of argument than of truth. 
 
The famous episode of Carneades’ appearance in Rome as member of an Athenian 
embassy in 155 BC is also indicative of the possible disquieting effects of philosophical 
dialectic for the Romans; according to reports of the episode, the sceptic had in accordance 
with the principles of the New Academy on the first day praised justice, and on the second 
spoken against it; Philus’ report in Cicero’s De Re Publica, which is based on this speech, 
suggests that Carneades included in it a lesson on Realpolitik which proved the Roman 
aspirations for empire as incompatible with the principles of justice32. This was a legendary 
episode that constantly reminded Romans (at least the conservative among them) of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Leg. 1.53: Quia me Athenis audire ex Phaedro meo memini, Gellium familiarem tuum, quom pro consule 
ex praetura in Graeciam uenisset <esset>que Athenis, philosophos, qui tum erant, in locum unum conuocasse 
ipsisque magno opere auctorem fuisse, ut aliquando controuersiarum aliquem facerent modum. Quodsi essent 
eo animo ut nollent aetatem in litibus conterere, posse rem conuenire, et simul operam suam illis esse 
pollicitum, si posset inter eos aliquid conuenire.  
32 See especially Rep. 3.24. 
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subversive power of philosophy and might suggest why Antiochus was eager to dissociate 
himself from the sceptic tradition and offer an alternative system with a Platonic pedigree, 
once he had the opportunity to do so. 
 
3. Antiochus’ Peripateticism 
Going back to Antiochus’ philosophical choices, it is plausible to assume, in the light of 
the above-mentioned suggestions, that if he attempted to restore the school of Plato to its 
true tradition (i.e. its pre-sceptical phase), then he did it by connecting it with Peripatetic 
teaching, which was taken, not only to be compatible with, but also to systematize and 
further develop the (alleged) Platonic doctrines, in line with Hellenistic philosophical 
developments. Even if this did not result in a ‘historical’ reading of Plato, according to our 
contemporary standards33, we have no reason to assume that for Antiochus himself placing 
Plato on a par with Aristotle and Theophrastus constituted a sort of betrayal; assuming that 
Plato was a dogmatist, Antiochus’ stance was rather suggestive of a certain belief in 
philosophical progress, a belief which was taken to be compatible with the conviction that 
Plato had laid down the foundations for everything that followed upon him in all branches 
of philosophy.  
 If the hypothesis of a Peripatetic influence on Antiochus is correct, then an obvious 
question arises as to how did Antiochus come in contact with Peripatetic ideas. Such a 
Peripatetic teaching can be taken to have been known to Antiochus from his original 
allegiance, the circles of the ‘New Academy’, where the Peripatos was frequently used by 
the Academic sceptics in their dialectical arguments against the Stoics and Epicureans: in 
Diogenes Laertius we read that Clitomachus, the pupil of Carneades was well versed in all 
three sects, the Academy, the Peripatetics and the Stoics34. Thus, whereas the Peripatetic 
school had declined after Theophrastus, who was a major figure in the Hellenistic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Or even according to the standards of a ‘Platonist’ like Plutarch, who attempts to read Platonem ex 
Platone, s. especially his work De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo.	  
34 D.L. 4.67. 
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philosophical scene, Peripatetic arguments most likely survived in an indirect way in the 
debates of the Academic sceptics35. Through the mouth of Carneades, such arguments 
proved their vigour and, to put it into the New Academy’s own terms, their ‘probability’ or 
‘reasonableness’36 by way of resisting dialectical challenges. The step towards adopting 
these persuasive views as ‘true’ proved to be a small one, once Antiochus decided to re-
establish Academic identity for himself, after Philo’s failure to defend a coherent sceptic 
position with regard to katalēpsis. Especially, on the domain of epistemology, the reliance 
of the Peripatos on intuition and its less stringent criteria, in comparison with Stoicism, for 
the acquisition of knowledge could escape the pre-dominantly anti-Stoic Academic 
critique; Philo’s critique of dogmatic epistemology was after all tailored against the Stoic 
definition of katalēpsis. Thus, Antiochus could show to the sceptics that he was led to the 
approval of the ‘ancients’ by virtue of their argumentative force and not (merely, at least) 
by opportunism, as Cicero claims in an ad hominem argument against Antiochus in his 
Lucullus37. 
It is from the Peripatos that we have also the only solid evidence for Antiochus’ 
first-hand engagement with texts; in Antiochean passages in Cicero, there is a clear 
reference to the esoteric and exoteric works of the Peripatetic school, to works of 
Theophrastus and a vague reference to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, falsely attributed 
to Nicomachus himself38; the latter might have come to the hands of Antiochus through 
Lucullus’ library, which was probably enriched with important acquisitions after the 
Roman conquest of Athens39. The existence of such heterogeneous Peripatetic material left 
room for diaphōnia, which Antiochus, as becomes clear from relevant passages in Cicero, 
was eager to accommodate: thus, he stresses the internal unity of the Peripatetic teaching 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Cf. Cicero’s ND 1.11 on  the requirement that the ‘New Academic’ can argue both for and against all 
schools. 
36 The two terms translate πίθανον and εὔλογον. 
37 S. Luc. 69-70: numquam a Philone discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent habere. Unde 
autem subito vetus Academia revocata est? nominis dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere 
voluisse. quod erant qui illum gloriae causa facere dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut i qui se sequerentur 
Antiochii vocarentur. For a similar critique, cf. Plut. Cic. 4.1-2. 
38 S. Fin. 5.12. 
39 S. Plut. Luc. 42 and the allusions in Cic. Fin. 3. 7-10. 
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despite the difficulty to offer consistent doctrines on a number of issues, which seem to 
have remained inconclusive in the writings of the school. 
A case in point is the role that external factors play in eudaimonia: whereas 
Aristotle remained unclear on the exact relationship between virtue and external goods, 
Theophrastus in his work On Happiness went so far as to deny that the virtuous person can 
be happy, if fortune is unfavourable. This allowed the view that a vicious person may 
possess a degree of happiness if in favourable circumstances, assuming that the notions of 
happiness and misery are symmetrical⎯ but Theophrastus was not willing to grant this. 
Antiochus attempts, in the last book of De Finibus, to formulate a more coherent position 
for the old tradition by introducing into his ethics the differentiation between vita beata 
and vita beatissima: virtue is both necessary and sufficient for happiness (since the latter 
consists essentially in actions and the ‘aiming’ at goods), but the availability of external 
goods (which is subject to fortune) guarantees a higher degree of happiness; this is a 
position that Antiochus ascribes to Aristotle himself with a vague reference to the 
Nicomachean Ethics: 
quod maxime efficit Theophrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodum 
fortunae datur. quod si ita se habeat, non posit beatam praestare vitam 
sapientia. Haec mihi videtur delicatior, ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio, quam 
virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium 
Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse 
Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Cic. Fin. 
5.12 
This effect is produced especially by Theophrastus’ book On Happiness in 
which a large influence is allowed to fortune, though if his statements were 
true, wisdom would not have the power to ensure happiness. This is in my 
opinion a softer and more delicate view than is required by the power and 
dignity of virtue. So let us stick to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus, whose 
carefully written treatise on morals is indeed reputed to be by Aristotle, but I 
see nothing to prevent the son from having been like the father. 
The choice that Antiochus makes on the issue, i.e. to guarantee the sufficiency of virtue for 
a happy life, does not constitute an arbitrary collection of different views but answered to 
real dialectical challenges advanced by the Stoics; his aim was to formulate, using tools 
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from within the tradition (however, curiously, no use is made of views expressed in Plato’s 
works on this point), a clear position on a topic which was of dialectical relevance, in a 
way that it would dissolve the appearance that his favoured school, the Peripatetics, were 
torn between incompatible positions, and thus inferior to the Stoic school which had a clear 
(and uncompromising) view on the matter. 
Here again, historical circumstances seem to have played a role. The advocacy of 
Peripatetic identity by a former Academic had become easier after the disintegration of the 
philosophical institutional landscape in Athens, and when no one else was there to claim 
the title of the ‘Peripatetic’ for oneself. Critolaus is the only one in the row of 
Theophrastus’ followers who is taken seriously by Antiochus as an opponent, since he in 
some sense ‘returned’ to the ancients as well40, but he was already dead by the time 
Antiochus initiated his movement; his pupil Diodorus, the last Peripatetic for whom we 
have evidence of activity on Athenian soil at the end of the second century BC, by 
introducing absence of pain into his conception of the final end was regarded as heterodox 
and thus not a viable opponent. Another Peripatetic philosopher in Rome, Staseas of 
Naples, who was the house philosopher of M. Piso and according to the testimony of 
Cicero expounded a rather different view of the system, than Antiochus did41 (perhaps 
following the line of Critolaus that Antiochus wanted to attack) was far away to be a threat, 
and did not claim the Platonic tradition for himself as did Antiochus. The lack of an 
authoritative edition of Aristotle, which was made, allegedly, at the end of the first century 
BC by Andronicus of Rhodes supported such a pluralism of views42. 
On the other hand, the confrontation with the Stoic school played a pivotal role for 
the development of the ‘Old Academic’ system: the attempt at coherence was largely a 
reaction to the standards set by the systematic philosophy par excellence in the Hellenistic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Fin. 5.14: Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen 
<ne> is quidem in patriis institutis manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. 
hic quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest.  
41 S. Fin. 5.8; 5.75. 
42 The diaphōnia on the role of externals for happiness to which Antiochus alludes in Fin. 5.12 resulted from 
reading Theophrastus’ On Fortune and the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (esp. 1100b22-1101a8), where 
Aristotle seems to differentiate between the eudaimon and the makarios. 
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period, namely to Stoicism, and it was clear that Antiochus in his polemic attitude towards 
the school aimed to challenge the role of the Stoics as the only representatives of an ethics 
based on the intrinsic value of virtue and a positive epistemology43. Late Stoics themselves 
were largely abandoning the contra-intuitive views of the first period of the school, 
affirming civil morality and the status quo, and thus gaining considerable popularity in 
Rome. This development was triggered by the critique of the sceptical Academy on the 
basis of Peripatetic theses, and, under this pressure, some of the Peripatetic ideas were 
addressed by the Stoics themselves44. Against them, Antiochus attempted to show that their 
theses could be find in their ‘original’ form in the writings of the ancients, thus making 
their school itself a redundant correctio of the ancient tradition45; on this issue, as in others, 
Antiochus could be following again the ‘New Academic’ teacher Carneades, who was the 
first to argue (as part of his anti-Stoic critique) that the difference between Stoics and 
Peripatetics is merely terminological46: once a convinced Peripatetic, Antiochus could use 
this critique for his own purpose in the defence of the ‘old tradition’. Antiochus, through 
his defense of an inclusive reading of the Academico-Peripatetic tradition, could also 
combat those Stoics who saw in Plato a great inspiration⎯ most, notably Panaetius47 and 
Posidonius48⎯, and who attempted perhaps to vindicate him for the Stoic tradition49.  
Varro, reporting Antiochus, stresses the fact that Zeno, himself a pupil of Polemo, decided 
to depart from the Academy and create his own school; in opposition to Zeno’s ‘heresy’, 
there is a conscious exaggerated attempt in Antiochus to show that the last generation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Since Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, was himself a pupil of Xenocrates and Polemo (s. D.L. 7.1), 
the Stoics could also claim an ‘Academic’ pedigree for themselves, thus rivaling Antiochus. 
44 See the remarks on Panaetius and Posidonius as ‘Aristotelising’ in Cicero. The Stoic account of ethics in 
Cicero’s De Finibus 3 is characteristic of a new form of presentation of Stoic ethics, which took shape most 
probably under the influence of Academic attacks on the basis of Peripatetic premises. 
45 On the presentation of Stoicism as a mere correctio of the ‘Old Academy’, see Acad. 1.43: horum esse 
autem arbitror, ut Antiocho nostro familiari placebat, correctionem veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam 
novam disciplinam putandam. 
46 S. Fin. 3.41. The Antiochean spokesperson uses the same argument in Fin. 5.22. 
47 S. especially Fin. 4.79: Panaetius nec acerbitatem sententiarum nec disserendi spinas probavit fuitque in 
altero genere mitior, in altero illustrior semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, 
Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant.  
48 Posidonius is attested to have commented on Plato’s Timaeus in S.E. Math. 6.93. 
49 S. also the relevant discussion of Bonazzi in Sedley (2012:315). 
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Platonic pupils in the pre-Arcesilean era were ‘diligent defenders of the doctrines that they 
had received from their predecessors’, and, thus, the true guardians of the Platonic 
philosophy, which the late Stoics aimed at reviving50. This anti-Stoic aspect of the ‘Old 
Academy’ runs counter to the picture of a predominantly ‘Stoicizing’ Antiochus, which is 
prevalent in scholarly literature51.  
In light of the assumptions presented, we may, by contrast, ascribe to Antiochus the belief 
that Peripatetic philosophy could incorporate Platonism and ‘disarm’ Stoicism, resulting in 
a unified front of Greek philosophy against the ‘obscene’ Epicurus. This could show that 
Greek philosophy was not in the hands of the sceptics torn between different, mutually 
exclusive positions, but could escape diaphōnia and offer a reliable tool of education, but 
also secure guidance for life.   
Finally some remarks on the fate of the school: the movement of the ‘Old 
Academy’ was short-lived, although Antiochus’ ‘inclusive’ view of the ancient tradition 
exercised a significant influence, which was transmitted through Cicero and Varro to 
Augustine and beyond. With the appearance of new intellectual centres and the creation of 
libraries in Rome52, Antiochus’ dialectical defence of the ‘ancients’, which enabled an 
inclusive understanding of Platonism and, we may add, a Peripatetic reading of Plato, was 
superseded by the meticulous study of the ancient texts heralding the production of 
commentaries and exegetical works as the primary philosophical activity. The two most 
known pupils of Antiochus, Cratippus of Pergamum and Aristo of Alexandria were, 
perhaps under the pressure of arising competing interpretations of Plato53, forced to 
abandon the denomination of the ‘Old Academy’, and to proclaim themselves openly as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Acad. 1.34: post eos Polemo et Crates unaque Crantor in Academia congregati diligenter ea quae a 
superioribus acceperant tuebantur. 
51 Most notably, see Frede M. (1999: 776): ‘But the picture of Plato’s doctrine which he sc. Antiochus 
developed is one heavily coloured by Stoicism’. Cf. Annas (1993: 180). Hostile sources, such as S.E. PH 
1.235 have contributed as well to the presentation of Antiochus as a Stoic. 
52 According to a story transmitted in Strabo xiii.1.54 and Plut. Sulla 26, the Aristotelian ‘esoteric’ treatises 
were bought by Apellicon around 100 BC and after the capture of Athens, Sulla took them to Rome and they 
became part of his library. The Greek grammarian Tyrannion worked on them, until Andronicus undertook a 
new edition of the Aristotelian text.  
53 This is a development associated with Eudorus of Alexandria. 
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Peripatetics; this is the evidence we have from Philodemus’ Index Academicorum54. 
Cratippus, who became the teacher of Cicero’s son, does not use the name of the ‘Old 
Academy’ anymore. And after the 40s BC, we find no recorded trace of the school of 
Antiochus, a period which might coincide with the editorial activity of Andronicus of 
Rhodes. 
As part of this new shaping of philosophical identity, the denominations 
‘Academic’ and ‘Peripatetic’, the collective names, which were still used by Antiochus 
gradually gave their place to those of ‘Platonists’ and ‘Aristotelians’55, suggesting that 
philosophy was now centred on the fixed, written words of the two ‘towering’ masters, and 
not on the dialectical confrontation and comparison of their views with those of other 
schools, as it is still the case for Antiochus’ treatment of the ‘ancients’. Through a renewed 
close reading of Plato the attempt to understand him through Peripatetic schemata could be 
resisted as well and other methods of systematization, which could do justice to the 
Platonic metaphysics were sought. Most of this activity took place away from Athens. 
Although, Antiochus’ ‘Old Academy’ prepared the ground for these exegetical 
movements, it stands alone as a ‘post-hellenistic’ phenomenon, which bridged Plato and 
Aristotle together under the banner of the latter and not the other way around: in the 
following centuries, Aristotle was recruited by philosophers who claimed to convey Plato’s 




Cicero. De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. Libri Quinque. Ed. by L.D. Reynolds, OCT, 
1998 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Col. 35, Index Acad. (PHerc. 1021). For a new reading of the fragments, see Blank (2007). 
55 For a mapping of this development, see Glucker (1978:206-25). 
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Ibid.  De Natura Deorum. Academica. Transl. by H. Rackham, Cambridge Mass. (The 
Loeb Classical Library), 1951 (rev. edition)  
Polemonis Academici Fragmenta ed. by M. Gigante Rend. Acc. Archeol. Napoli 51, pp. 
91-144, 1976 
Sextus Empiricus Against the Logicians (Adversus Mathematicos Bks. 7 and 8), Trans. by  
R.G. Bury (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press 
Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Ed.& tr. 
W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby, R.W. Sharples and D. Gutas. 2 Vols. Leiden, 1992  
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